

Situated Transnationalism: The Social and Political Relations of Young European Muslims

Justin Gest, Harvard University

Abstract:

Scholars are attempting to address the question of whether Western Muslims are primarily oriented towards states of residence or whether their identities transcend national boundaries in the name of broader Islamic solidarity. I ask, rather, if these two alternatives are necessarily irreconcilable. In this article, I will argue that not only are these two ideas compatible. Indeed, I contend that the reconciliation of the universal with the local is actually the default, observable state of Western Islam, just as it is the default, observable state of Islam in Muslim-majority countries. First, I will engage in a discussion about what we mean by the idea of “transnationalism”, and why Western Muslims are a particularly interesting and useful case study of this phenomenon. I will next critically review ideas about Western Muslim identity and why it has ostensibly trended toward the transnational—and subsequently propped up the argument that Muslims are actively “post-national” and have “abandoned” national political arenas. I will then introduce my conception of Muslim’s situated transnationalism, and commence an analysis of Muslim transnational spheres with an eye to their rootedness in ambient debates, vernacular, values, and taste. In the end, I will argue that transnational religiosity, sociality, and politics is subject and frequently adapted to local contexts, which require transnational activities to fit in local structures of power and attract the support and faith of individuals with locally conditioned preferences. While transnationalism is increasingly facilitated by the capacity of globalizing technology, political and social communities remain stubbornly tied to the local because individuals themselves remain situated.

(8,208 words)

Please do not cite without the expressed permission of the author.

Situated Transnationalism: The Social and Political Relations of Young European Muslims

Justin Gest, Harvard University

The challenge of accommodating local needs while appealing to global solidarity is a one which has nourished still-growing controversies about European Muslims' position in their countries of settlement, even as Muslim families enter their second and third generation of residence. Such concerns have been fuelled by conceptualizations of Islam, Islamic identity, and Islamic social and political relations as transnational and universal (Ramadan, 1999, 2001, 2004; Kepel, 2004). Some scholars have gone as far as observing Muslims' "abandonment of the national as the main or the only political and discursive arena where cultural and identity politics are played out" (Salih, 2004: 997). As a result, Peter Mandaville (2004: 491) notes and attempts to address the question of "whether Muslim identities in countries such as the UK and France are primarily oriented towards states of residence or whether, and the extent to which, these identities transcend national boundaries in the name of broader religious solidarity and/or political communities and agendas defined in terms of Islam." I ask, rather, if these two alternatives are necessarily irreconcilable.

In this article, I will argue that not only are these two ideas compatible. Indeed, I contend that the reconciliation of the universal with the local is actually the default, observable state of religious, social and political relations among Western Muslims—just as it is the default, observable state of religious, social and political relations of Muslims in Muslim-majority countries. First, I will engage in a discussion about what we mean by the idea of "transnationalism", and why Western Muslims are a particularly interesting and useful case study of this phenomenon. I will next critically review ideas about Western Muslim identity and why it has ostensibly trended toward the transnational—and subsequently propped up the argument that Muslims are actively "post-national" and have "abandoned" national political arenas. I will then introduce my conception of Muslim's situated transnationalism, and commence an analysis of Muslim transnational spheres with an eye to their rootedness in ambient debates, vernacular, values, and taste.

This argument is based on information gathered during case studies of Moroccan communities in the southern barrios of Madrid and Bangladeshi communities in the boroughs of London's East End. As opposed to a great deal of previous work on European Muslim political identity and behavior, this work did not only solicit the perspectives of community elites and leaders, but also focused on extensive interviews with a selection of common respondents. Complemented by ethnographic observation, I compiled 97 qualitative interviews of ordinary young men (60 interviews) and elites (37 interviews) while immersed in these two locales. The young men were all 18–28 years old, second generation or later, migrant-origin, Moroccan or Bangladeshi, Muslims living in the same local region. Interviews were conducted employing elite-style, depth techniques, and participants were approached in a broad variety of neighborhoods and venues in order to account for variation in behavior and attitudes. It is thought that my conclusions differ from previous studies precisely because transnationalism was here explored from a variety of status positions that reflect common quotidian existence in the selected venues.

These methods were chosen in the interest of building descriptive models of social and political behavior at the local and transnational levels. This article will build such a model, using “ideal types” to analyze the transnationalism of Muslim relations in different spheres. The ideal types will sharply differentiate the private, religious, social and political spheres of transnationalism in order to distinguish the characteristics and contexts of such relations in each. In this way, these ideal types do not expect to be validated by empirical realities; they seek to help observers understand empirical realities. Individual actors can be expected to transgress such constructed boundaries, as many phenomena blur the religious with the social with the political. The question is how divorced these phenomena and associated responses are from situated circumstances.

In the end, I will argue that transnational religiosity, sociality, and politics are subject and frequently adapted to local contexts, which require transnational activities to fit in local structures of power and attract the support of individuals with locally conditioned preferences. While transnationalism is increasingly facilitated by the capacity of globalizing technology, political and social communities remain stubbornly tied to the local because individuals themselves remain situated.

“Transnationalism” and Muslims

Transnationalism refers to the sustained connection of an entity in one nation-state or society to another. While this can clearly apply to corporations, organized crime, social movements and media conglomerates, we are here interested in its use in characterizing migrants’ activities and existences. Migrants’ transnationalism has been studied in interdisciplinary terms of their political participation and intervention, investment, remissions, ethnicity, religion, gender, family and sense of identity (For examples, consider Georges, 1990; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al, 1999; Portes, 2001; Jones Correa, 2002; Vertovec, 2004). Ayse Caglar (2001: 607) writes that scholarship on transnationalism has provided “a new analytic optic which makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration. It allows an analysis of how migrants construct and reconstitute their lives as simultaneously embedded in more than one society.”

Precisely because the “national” occupies so many different spheres of human activity, it is often unclear to which sphere the “transnational” refers. Ralph Grillo (2004: 864) summarizes that transnationalism “refers to the social, cultural, economic and political relations which are between, above or beyond the nation-state, interconnecting, transcending, perhaps even superseding what has been for the past two hundred years their primary locus.” Basch, et al. (1994: 7) define it as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies or origin and settlement.” Smith and Guarnizo (1998: 4) explain that the complexity of transnationalism is reflected by the scope of its effects. These include the globalization of capitalism, the technological revolution in means of transportation and communication, decolonization and the spread of human rights, and the expansion of social networks. Smith and Guarnizo note that while transnationalism is conventionally “celebrated” as reflective of an anti-hegemonic triumph over the control of governments and structural power relations, transnationalism is not always the act of resistance it is depicted to be (1998: 5-7). Indeed, migrants expanding capacities can also be used in the interest of exerting political influence (Hockenos, 2003), accumulating capital (Mitchell, 1993), or accommodating—rather than defying—identity essentialisms (Gest, 2010b).

In reference to communities of Western Muslims, it is extraordinary that a term often employed to describe the first generation of migrants is so salient for the second and indeed the emergent third generation as well. For Muslims today, Mandaville notes that there are multiple forms of contemporary transnationalism (2009: 494-496). These exist in persistent Muslim people flows as before, but also in globalizing Muslim social and political movements, a global Muslim public sphere, and *ummah*-oriented solidarity. Interestingly, the trends inspiring the observation of these forms are unlike the traditional migrant transnationalism that characterize Muslim global relations 40 years ago. The first Muslim migrants to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (Northern Europe) and then again in the 1970s and 1980s (Southern Europe) connected in the same ways defined by authors examining non-Muslim national migrants like Mexican-Americans. They dabbled in the political affairs of Bangladesh and Pakistan, connected to Turkish television and newspapers, imported products from Algeria, and returned frequently to the hinterlands of Morocco. This is not the transnationalism of their children and grandchildren. This newest generation dabbles in the political affairs of Israel and Palestine (a place most have never visited), follow current affairs on Al-Jazeera.com (in English), and consume fashionable goods imported from Mali to Malaysia.

While many observers have fingered this enduring and evolving transnationalism as an exhibit of Western Muslims' relative lack of integration, it actually suggests that Muslims represent a different type of political community that is more organically transnational than national migrant groups from historic sending countries like Ireland, China or the Dominican Republic. Connected by the embattled but enduring ties of common faith, it is a community with a propensity to the transnational not because of its resources, but because of the structural nature of Islam. As Bowen (2004: 882) explains:

Islam has an intrinsic universality (which it shares with Christian religions) and also more specific universalistic dimensions. The message of the Qur'ân was to turn away from localised deities and worship the transcendent God. The capitals of Islamic polities shifted from one city to another (Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Istanbul), meaning the caliphate was and is not limited to one particular region or centre—and indeed in some contemporary imaginings can be entirely deterritorialised (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002). ...The perduring role of Arabic as the primary language of scholarship and the development of a global jurisprudence (albeit with several schools or traditions) made possible international communication among scholars. The standardisation of the Qur'ân, the requirement to pray in Arabic, and the popular enjoyment of reciting and writing verses of the Qur'ân promote among ordinary Muslims the sense of participation in a universal message (Hirschkind 2001). The annual pilgrimage brings together a sampling of Muslims, and the Saudi government's quota system ensures that pilgrims will meet a geographically wide range of fellow pilgrims. Daily, theoretically five times daily, Muslims turn their bodies in the direction of Mecca in order to carry out the obligatory rituals of worship (*salât*). ...This sense of Islam's transnational character is diffuse but powerful, and it derives its power from the ways in which rituals reproduce, and histories remind Muslims of, the shared duties and practices of Muslims across political boundaries. In its impulse to refuse particularistic loyalties to ethnic groups or to a nation-state, this consciousness first and foremost creates an imagination of an Islamic community transcending specific boundaries and borders.

As a result, the transnational becomes a conventional sphere of historical consciousness (See Roy, 2004: 109), rather than a self-selecting club pursued by the elite, inclined and able. Today's globalization particularly facilitates this because it is in many ways a mass phenomenon, rather than one which is conditioned on material capacity.

By communicating about religious affairs cross-nationally and requiring adherence to certain universal practices and norms, Islam suggests the supersession of nationally imposed

civic obligations. And as certain Western democracies seek to monopolize the public sphere by limiting religious expression to private life, Islam challenges this process of “secularization” with its extra-ritualistic application to governance, lifestyle, and social affairs. As Bowen writes (2004: 880), Islam resists national assimilation, while nation-states require it. The disproportionate publicity of fundamentalist applications of Islam’s universalism has led many Western reactionaries to regard Islam’s transnational expression as alien and dangerous. Nevertheless, the question unaddressed by critics fearful of Muslims’ foreign allegiance and fundamentalist preachers calling for *hijra* (emigration) to Muslim land is, “Which land is that?” Indeed, unlike the transnationalism of their parents, the newest generations of Western Muslims are tied most closely to the destination country—the country of their birth, schooling, and residence. So their transnationalism is not oriented to a “homeland” or any territory at all. However, the point of this article is that it would be equally incorrect to suggest that this deterritorialization entails young Muslims’ or their Muslim descendants’ de-culturation from their home societies.

A Situated Transnationalism

Islam is not a singular physical artifact of the past that may be placed on display to reveal a single truth, like a monument or fossil. As a faith, it is the evolving product of an oral tradition that collected and inscribed the words of God and passed them on to posterity. Like all religions and traditions, its generational application thus entails the continuous re-enactment of its associated rituals and principles. Indeed, the simple fact that “authenticity” is the fundamental criterion of transnational Salafist Islam suggests that it is a situated re-enactment that is being measured according to how closely it adheres to the acts and intentions of the Prophet Muhammad. In this way, we can logically deduce that European and transnational Islam does not and cannot represent its purported origin. Each manifestation is but a reproduction using what intellectual materials and technological tools are available, using what culture can be found to unify Muslims across borders.

The problem is that, as Clifford Geertz theorized (1973: 312), culture is “the structure of meaning through which men give shape to lived experience.” Universalist Islam is suggesting that it can build a shared transnational Islamic identity, sociality and culture without a shared lived experience. When Islam is stripped of its situated cultural accoutrements, what is left is an extensive but occasionally vague—and therefore subjective—moral structure. This moral structure represents the pillars, values, and rituals that govern Islamic life, but are not specifically applied. With the exception of *hajj*, the elements of a transnational Islamic culture tend to be those tenets and debates which can be broadcast extensively in different languages—for example, frustration with the Israel-Palestine peace process, wars in Iraq, Kashmir and Afghanistan, collective experience with post-9/11 scrutiny. However, this culture is ultimately mediated. Though such structure and mediated messages appear to uniformly *define* lived experiences, they hardly *unite* them in a way that promotes the creation of a common heritage and tradition, a mutually dependent future, intelligible expression and art, or agreed normative and political interpretation. Here, it may be useful to consider an analogy. While soccer is played by the same rules in nearly every country in the world, its form, philosophy, norms, traditions and—certainly—culture differs from nation to nation, and sometimes from stadium to stadium.

Culture begins with the mutual expression and enactment of many individuals’ consciousness in a public sphere which cannot be mediated but felt, lived, and mutually

understood. For this reason, that which is called “transnational” cannot be construed as if it were emancipated from the contingencies of history (Appadurai, 1996: 185), from alternative cosmopolitanisms and contestation (Smith, 1992; Robbins, 1993), or from the constraints and opportunities that contextuality imposes (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998: 11). Even while resources for communication are increasingly global, the individual lens is quite situated and subject to juridical control, economic development and political sentiment. This may not be eternally true, but it remains true for now due to limitations on space and time. Currently, the flimsiness of transnational Muslim culture is currently perpetuated by discursive references, global communications media, and politicians and pundits who take the concept of transnational Muslim culture at face-value.

With our key concepts and ideas grounded, the remainder of this article will build a descriptive model of transnational behavior that represents its contentious progression from individual consciousness, to religiosity, to sociality, to political activism. As emphasized in this article’s introduction, the following model offers ideal types that are intended to better comprehend and guideline empirical realities, not reflect them. It will separate each sphere of expression in order to:

- 1) aid observers in understanding the many dimensions of transnationalism;
- 2) develop observational or attitudinal criteria for objectively accounting for these dimensions and determining just how contextualized transnational behavior is;
- 3) exhibit the progressive difficulties associated with different spheres of transnational relations (ie: religiosity is influenced by local convention, sociality depends on interaction, political activism requires opportunity structures);
- 4) demonstrate, by juxtaposing the criteria and evidence presented here, how these different (but often simultaneous) expressions fall short of a genuinely “post-national” “abandonment” of the national and local public sphere.

In documenting the progression and nature of different expressions of transnationalism, the evidence and discussion will demonstrate that individuals’ culture each remains stubbornly local—that transnationalism remains situated. Indeed, transnational Islam detached from national cultures (particularly given the authenticity it claims) is easier to imagine than practice. It is easier said than done.

The Creation of a Transnational Muslim Consciousness

Muslim transnationalism takes its most primary form in individuals’ consciousness and self-identification. While this article does not attempt to analyze transnational consciousness, Figure One models a criteria to detect its observable aspects in contrast to other forms of transnationalism, but also in contrast to more local connections. Because of its personal nature, consciousness represents the most difficult expression of transnationalism to objectively recognize, but also the form that is most accessibly engaged. It is but the product of memory, imagination, and intellect held privately. However, this privacy also means that transnational consciousness precedes and underpins other more public expressions. It is effectively identified using the following criteria:

- 1) Where are those people with whom one most closely identifies in the absence of context?
- 2) Can one's identity be narrowed to one location?
- 3) In tragedy, where are those people with whom one is the first to empathize?
- 4) What is the language of one's thoughts or subconscious?

If the first generation of migrants seeks to re-assemble ethno-religious identities, the second and third generations seek to reconstitute and reconstruct them. The process of reconstitution among young people is often in response to their distance from—but also their realization of the constructed nature of—their parent's traditions and worldview. This has also been the realization of a variety of analyses of identity which characterize them as unfinished, ever-moving “productions” (Hall 1996; Bauman, 1996; Appadurai, 1996). And yet, as Valentine and Sporton write (2009: 736), identities remain situated in that “they are performed in, and through, different spaces (such as the home, the nation, the transnational diaspora), such that one identity category may be used to differentiate another in specific spatial contexts and particular subject positions may become salient or irrelevant in particular spaces.” Somers (1994: 606) adds that “it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities...all of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making.” Despite Western Muslims' cries for self-determination, their transnational consciousness is significantly conditioned by ambient discourse and the structure of local social relations in three primary ways: first, young Muslims' aloofness from their parents' specifically territorialized Islam and Islamic culture; second, the discursive creation of transnational ‘European Muslims’ as a rhetorical category by national governments; and third, the lack of local Islamic orthodoxy in young Western Muslims' countries of citizenship. Let's address these conditions in order.

First, many young Muslims in the West see their parents' or grandparents' homelands and religious habits as geographically and culturally distant from their lives (Gest, 2010a: 60) The ‘old country’ is viewed as backward and they are often unable to relate to the customs, which appear foreign when juxtaposed to the social habits and ideas by which they have been conditioned in the Western educational system and society. Older generations have been characterized by what Margaret Pickles (1995) calls “frozen clock syndrome” to describe those immigrants who live as if the culture clock stopped the moment they departed from their homeland. As a result, according to Wiktorowicz (2005: 99), the older generations' understanding of Islam is viewed as ‘archaic, backward and ill-informed’ and too ‘focused on issues of ritual and tradition devoid of political import’. Zakaria, a 21-year-old British Bangladeshi security guard who lives with his parents, says:

	Consciousness
Venue	Individual
Behavior	Private Sentiment, Self-identification
Facilities	Memory, Perception, Imagination, Construction
Criteria	Where are those people with whom one most closely identifies? Etc.

Figure One: Transnational Consciousness

There's a lot of things that the Bengali community does that I'm like, 'You're not following Islamic culture, you're following Arab culture or Bengali culture.'...Most Muslim weddings in Tower Hamlets go by Bengali traditions, which are derived from Hinduism, not Islam. In Bangladesh, women had to stop studying to take care of the family. Here, they can keep going. A lot of Bengalis have twisted Islamic arranged marriage into forced marriage. Islam doesn't give the parents the final say.

The younger generation is also often unable to communicate in the language of their family's homeland, and subsequently loses touch with that country's traditions and culture as an aspect of their identity. The combined effect is a group of young Muslims less inclined to follow their parents' dismissal of Western culture, styles and customs, seeking guidance that is more attuned to a modern life outside the ethnic homeland (Gest, 2010a: 60).

Witnessing the parents' struggles to replace their acculturated Islamic practices and traditions in a new venue, many young Muslims conclude that acculturated forms of Islam are not universal and therefore inauthentic and less meaningful to their existence in the new venue. Many of the young Muslims interviewed appeared to have reached this conclusion individually before realizing its wider relevance with peers. In this way, those who expressed a relationship to a collective transnational consciousness often portrayed it as an individual choice to separate from the views and lifestyle of their families, mosques and ethno-national cultures. Intriguingly, no self-identified universalist subjects recognized their own susceptibility to accumulating the kind of ethno-national "baggage" that accompanied their parents' Islam from places like Bangladesh. Indeed, no respondent branded his Islam "British Islam". Several of the Moroccans interviewed explained that there could be no such thing as Spanish Islam—even though such a phenomenon existed for eight centuries, and endures in places like Ceuta and Melilla.

Second, transnational migration and global mass culture has inspired the revitalization of many national identities like Britishness and *hispanidad*. Such concepts are often manifest as an anachronistic (if jingoistic) nostalgia for seemingly simpler times, which produces a nativist backlash against the attenuating forces of globalization and the accompanying exposure to diversity (Gest, 2010a: 23). This identity protectionism and its attempts to define itself against an established Other has created new categories like "Muslims," who were antecedently referred to as "Asians" in the United Kingdom and "Moroccans" (or more derogatively, "Moors") in Spain. Thus far, the net effect of pronouncing these new national fundamentalisms to compete with Islamic fundamentalisms has been the popularization of both extremes.

From the perspective of young Muslims interviewed, the fostering of stronger nationalism has corrupted the corresponding expansion of civic integration requirements. Islam has subsequently been embraced more tightly not only in the interest of defending the vilified portion of their multi-faceted identities. Transnational Islam also represents a response to social rejection, and an alternative to an assimilation process interpreted as a means of homogenization. Ismail, an 18-year-old British Bangladeshi member of the transnational Islamic party *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir*, says: 'I don't feel an identity crisis, because I feel like I have a relationship with God and so I don't have any problem saying that I am a Muslim. I've put myself in a box, and eliminated my British and Bengali ties. Do I need to claim to be British? No, I don't need to. I have a British passport. And I've only been to Bangladesh once, when I was a child, and I was too young to remember any of it.' While Ismail's statement simplifies his identity, it also shirks the responsibility of explaining to others the nuanced heterogeneity of his religion. Rather than an acknowledgement that disagreement exists and that he holds specific views, a more singular, global Islam is perceived to be a stronger response and defense of its perceived singular, global

vilification. While this may unify Ismail’s conception of his self-image, it also reinforces the erroneously monolithic image of his faith and its detractors—creating a race to the bottom.

Third, the contemporary endeavor to purify Islam from local acculturation has an extensive history, but it is more easily proposed in Europe which maintains but a shallowly rooted Islamic orthodoxy. Olivier Roy (2004: 121) points out that in 18th-century India, Shah Waliullah tried to separate Islam from the surrounding Indian culture, but that the Deobandi school he created was ultimately profoundly rooted in the local culture. In Muslim majority countries, Roy writes, “religious practice is embedded in social authority and does not need to be elaborated upon and justified by the believer” (2004: 152). Without such social authority in place in Europe, universalist Muslims see an opportunity to catalyze a “re-discovery” of the purportedly authentic essence of Islam that transcends religious diversity. This one embraces globalization for its capacity to spread *da’wa*, but rejects globalization for its capacity to dilute it. With only recent Muslim acculturation in Europe, universalists perceive an opportunity to delink Islam from any locale in pursuit of a transnational set of norms and traditions. However, in the process, the religion is only becoming re-situated and therefore re-constituted.

Situated Transnational Religiosity

We have already discussed the conceptual and practical difficulty of a transnationally authentic Islam. What is left then is to consider what Olivier Roy observes in Europe to be not religion, but religiosity—that is, “the way in which believers build and live their relationship with religion” (2004: 120). Religiosity can be the most

subtle of performances—the public representation of private faith.

Alternatively, it can also be conveyed with the most overt and sensationalized rhetoric and exhibitionism. Both are acts of self-expression, reference, debate and indications of religious practice (Figure Two). But in examining the transnational nature of this religiosity, we must ask the following principal questions:

- 1) Where are those people from whom one solicits religious or moral guidance?
- 2) Where are those people to whom the performance or expression is communicated?
- 3) Can the customs of one’s faith be located in a specific place?
- 4) Where are those people from whom one learnt religious practice and propriety?

	Consciousness	Religiosity
Venue	Individual	Moral Sphere
Behavior	Private Sentiment, Self-identification	Self-expression, Reference, Debate, Religious Practice
Facilities	Memory, Perception, Imagination, Construction	Communications Technology, Norms, Media Forms, Heritage
Criteria	Where are the people with whom one most closely identifies? Etc.	Where are the people from whom one solicits guidance? Etc.

Figure Two: Transnational Religiosity

The ability to enact some religious identities or realities rather than others is highly contingent on the “power-laden spaces” in and through which our experiences are lived (Valentine and Sporton, 2009: 748). To begin with, an individual’s religious orientation is more specific than that toward the *ummah*, in that different populations of Muslims pay attention to different sources of authority (Bowen, 2004: 883). As an egalitarian religion without an ecclesiastical hierarchy, Islam makes it difficult to distinguish a *sheikh* from a sham, as all are equal under God. This absence of a consolidated referential body that may address different social questions (or certify legitimate commentators) with a degree of superseding legitimacy enables individuals’ perceptions of the public sphere to go unchecked (Gest, 2010: 208). The young people interviewed here report that they form their opinions from a variety of sources—very few of which are certified by or accountable to any larger religious organization. Because few Western Muslims read and comprehend Arabic, there is substantial demand for Qur’anic commentary and guidance among individuals who read the scripture but do not understand it. This demand is being met by a proliferating group of ‘web preachers’ who write commentary on internet weblogs. While some of these ‘scholars’ are actually quite well-read and advocate peaceful, inclusive and balanced outlooks that work within democratic systems, others promulgate political agendas and hateful interpretations. The influence of both types is noteworthy, as several have gained a great deal of fame, but the internet is clearly a double-edged instrument that cuts both ways. Many of the British Bangladeshis interviewed say they rely on friends, neighbors and even ‘playground debates’ at school or university. Many of the Moroccans interviewed say they read the Qur’an, consult their families, or simply reflect. (For survey data on this question, see Mandaville, 2009: 501.)

A variety of the popular web preachers and websites mentioned by young people feature Western Muslim commentators. Suhaib Webb, Abdul-Hakim Murad, and Hamza Yusuf are each converts who speak in American or British accents and are able to apply Islamic teachings to Anglo-American quotidian life. This is also achieved by extremist commentators who also interpret Islam for local considerations but guide their adherents in alternative directions. Several British Bangladeshi men referred to the commentaries from websites and programming affiliated with *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir*, the transnational pro-caliphate political party. This reflects a dichotomy of Islamic universalism, one side of which emphasizes Islam’s compatibility with liberal values of tolerance and pluralism, while the other side emphasizes the idea of a single, rigid Islam that is not amenable to individual interpretation (Mandaville, 2009: 498). However, it is clear that in responding to questions asking, “What Islam says about...,” both sides are interpreting Islam in such a way that it might apply to the concerns of situated readers and audiences. Roy contends that this contributes to the wider process of objectifying Islam. He writes that “merely to ask such a question presupposes that one is not living in a true Muslim context, which means that secularization has succeeded” (Roy, 2004: 154).

More specifically, the rhetoric of “transnational” Islam in Europe depends on a vernacular that is often in languages other than Arabic, and therefore cannot always transcend national and local difference. To effectively communicate messages, commentators must rely on context-specific meanings that adapt the religion to become intelligible to situated adherents. And even when a text or concept may be expressed universally in Arabic, its understood significance may be contingent upon disparate contexts (See Eikelman and Piscatori, 1990: 204). The way language and exhibition is used thus impacts the nature of its meaning. As Werbner writes, “In their performative rhetoric the people we study essentialize their imagined communities in order to mobilize for action” (Werbner, 1997: 230). A further contextual

complication is contributed by the way that some articulated religiosities are favored over others thanks to the filters imposed by the local Muslim and non-Muslim public spheres. While filters employed by mosque committees and Islamic advocacy groups may work to vet sources of commentary and information, local media has the propensity to feature the loudest, most offensive, or most sensational speaker. This both constricts the religious sphere to the “safest” or “conservative” and the “radical” or “extreme”—under-representing a variety of hybridized and alternative religiosities.

In these ways, transnational religiosity is in some ways adapted for situated consumption, and in other ways distilled and therefore distorted by situated structures of power that limit religious expression and performance. This was reflected in respondents’ common portrayal of the religious sphere as a choice between a mosque subject to government scrutiny and communal conservatism or radical organizations advocating political Islam. Viq, a member of Hizb-Ut Tahrir, says, ‘When I was young, I remember I wanted to get rid of the mosque and start one in the basement. Now I know better. Because so much is government-funded, it’s hard for the *masjid* to be anti-establishment.’ Viq’s words reflect a binary between the ‘establishment’ and the ‘anti-establishment,’ with few further options. This limitation on discursive religiosity also affects performative religiosity—the symbolic religiosity of taste and preference.

Situated Transnational Sociality

Similar to religiosity, sociality is often communicated through performance and symbolism. It is therefore subject to similar filters of power relations and access. However, while religiosity is ultimately based on individuals’ aforementioned relationship to God, sociality is based on individuals’ relationships with each other. In this way, sociality represents a progressive leap in the model of transnationalism (Figure Three). Its manifestation is more observable and therefore requires action rather than mere implicit or explicit expression for affirmation. It is based on friendships, social practice and immediate belonging. In examining its transnationalism, it is therefore necessary to employ the following criteria:

- 1) Where are those people with whom one interacts the most?
- 2) By what means does one socialize with others?
- 3) Where are those people with whom one is most comfortable?
- 4) Where are those people with whom one finds the most in common?

Of course, as the social sphere is also subject to visual displays and rhetoric, performances may be misconstrued for sociality. Particularly with the near ubiquitous usage of social networking tools such as Facebook, MySpace, HighFive, and LinkedIn, individuals may illustrate their social (and professional) lives as they wish. While this may often suggest the true nature of their sociality, the temptation is to airbrush and polish the reality to reflect images that are aspirational. This poses several problems for the progression of a truly transnational Islamic sociality. First, as sociality—even as performative—necessarily entails the engagement of peers, it is often conveyed with a specific intelligibility. Second, Islamic social values tend to intermingle indistinguishably with those of the surrounding society. And third, the bridging of ethno-cultural barriers even domestically appears uncommon—let alone transnationally. Let us examine these in order.

	Consciousness	Religiosity	Sociality
Venue	Individual	Moral Sphere	Social Sphere
Behavior	Private Sentiment, Self-identification	Self-expression, Reference, Debate, Religious Practice	Friendship, Immediate Belonging, Social Practice
Facilities	Memory, Perception, Imagination, Construction	Communications Technology, Norms, Media Forms, Heritage	Social Networks, Diversification, Transportation
Criteria	Where are the people with whom one most closely identifies? Etc.	Where are the people from whom one solicits guidance? Etc.	Where are those people with whom one interacts the most? Etc.

Figure Three: Transnational Sociality

To address the first hindrance, consider the transnational social experience of Talal from London’s East End who had the extraordinary opportunity to visit Saudi Arabia for a religious retreat, where he was able to meet dozens of international peers. It was a Sufi Islamic school sponsored by an American institute that assembled young men from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Australia. Despite a shared interest in Islam and their common age, Talal explains that he became the closest to the other British participants. ‘We were involved in similar things,’ he says. ‘We had mutual friends. We all came with the similar mindset. We read the same books, listened to the same lectures by the same scholars, and are interested in the same spirituality.’ As for the others, ‘We’re on Facebook and email. If I went to America, I know I could go visit them, especially at conferences.’ Even as Talal socialized transnationally, he continued to speak the vernacular of his situated context—thus affecting the relationships he could build. This demonstrates how, even when one intends to address a transnational audience, one may be only locally intelligible. Salwa Ismail (2007: 7) writes, “Naming, marking and identifying are means through which subject positions of privilege and under-privilege are demarcated. For example, an item of clothing, a style of speech or a territorial association could enter into the identification of a subject in particular terms—as Islamist or secular, as progressive, conservative or liberal, as belonging to a particular class and so on.” While such a process of demarcation may be unintentional (as in the case of Talal), the transnational sociality may also be symbolic, status-conscious and concerned with communicating an image locally. Interestingly, cultural demarcation is precisely why many societies enforce a neutral, “secular” public sphere.

Secondly, secularity is often the structural framework within which European Islam—whether transnational or local—must function. In this way, Grillo (2004: 867) conceives of transnationalism as a “dialectic process, working both from inside and out.” He writes, “It involves how Muslims come to think about themselves, how the institutions of British society (including those associated with multicultural practices) have conceived them (locally and nationally), and how the two interact.” For this reason, discussions of sociality and social values will be different in different contexts. In Spain where there remains significant casual discrimination against migrants from North Africa, Moroccans often grappled with the prospect of intermarriage. In the United Kingdom where intermarriage is much more common, Bangladeshis were concerned to discuss the un-Islamic nature of arranged marriage. Similarly, East End Muslims campaigned for women’s educational achievement, the pursuit of careers in business and finance, a reduction in birth rates, and the domestication of fathers—reflecting common themes outside the East End in British society, but less prominent in patriarchic Spain.

Third, the most observable (and perhaps crudest) indication of transnational sociality simply requires an examination of social networks. And quite generally, despite growing rhetorical claims to transnational Islamic identities and consciousness, European Muslims appear very much subject to in-group ethnic solidarity—even if extra-ethnic peers are also Muslim. Indeed, even with his exposure to international conferences and a diverse university education, Talal’s social network is remains mostly British Bangladeshi, despite the growing population of Somali Muslims in the East End. This appears to be greatly true for respondents who were raised in mono-cultural ethnic enclaves. A Somali female respondent in Valentine and Sporton’s study (2009: 746) explained that she maintained a very different social identity when she lived in a diverse Dutch neighborhood than when her family moved to a Somali community in Sheffield, England:

Like if I compare Sheffield with Holland, here it is like all eyes on you because there are so many Somali people here and they all talk about each other. In Holland we were just free. Do what you want, go where you want ... Here, you go outside, you do something and your Mum knows what you’ve been doing because there are a lot of people around and say ‘oh I see your daughter and I’ve seen this’ ... I’ve gone more religious [since moving to the UK] because I’ve started wearing the scarf and that. In Holland I never used to wear a scarf, because here, when I saw the Somali community, I thought I’d respect them, you can’t go off like you’re in Holland.

In Madrid, Moroccans who maintained a transnational sociality tended to be less religious, and incorporated non-Moroccans and non-Muslims into their social sphere. Almost no participants interacted frequently with non-Moroccan Muslims. This reflects a common perception that not only was Islam irreconcilable with Spanish identity, but also the conventional social hierarchy that suggested Moroccans subordination to other Arabs in Spain. Transnational Islamic sociality is therefore conditioned on contextual restraints. While it can be the product of social sophistication and diverse exposure, in mono-cultural enclaves, it may only be the product of intra-ethnic social rejection.

Situated Transnational Political Activity

As the pursuit of certain socially established prerogatives, political activity represents an advanced stage of transnationalism. Democratic participation is a naturally cooperative endeavor, as even individual advocacy appeals to fellow citizens and solicits greater support. Indeed, the unity required for political action leads to a search for a political bloc that may be totally

constructed or unsustainable. While such unity has been transnationalized by the ease of remissions, the growth of civil society, and greater access to communication technology, a examination of its transnationalism must ask the following questions (See Figure Four):

- 1) Where is the outcome of one’s actions desired?
- 2) Where is one trying to affect change?
- 3) To what institution does one direct one’s political sentiment?
- 4) Where are those causes about which one is mobilized to advocate or act politically?

In examining transnational Islam, Bowen (2004: 869) segregates “universalistic” social norms from those which have been “nationally differentiated.” However, as this section will show, universalistic politics must appeal to national power structures and local preferences—whether a supranational effort reformulates to justify its cause according to standards of national law, or transforms itself to solicit local support. Both entail adaptations to local context.

In order to pursue its agenda, even universalist Islamic activists have been subject to the structures of entrenched political power. Jocelyne Cesari (2009: 165) writes that Islamic religious authority has been fragmented and accentuated through interaction with the secular environment: “The secularization of Islam is also visible in the vast and silent majority of Muslims’ acceptance of the separation between public and private space in their particular

	Consciousness	Religiosity	Sociality	Polity
Venue	Individual	Moral Sphere	Social Sphere	Political Sphere
Behavior	Private Sentiment, Self-identification	Self-expression, Reference, Debate, Ritual, Practice	Friendship, Immediate Belonging, Social Practice	Participation, Advocacy, Civic Practice
Facilities	Memory, Perception, Imagination, Construction	Communications Technology, Norms, Media, Heritage	Social Networks, Diversification, Transportation	Will, Communication Technology, Civil Society, Remissions
Criteria	Where are the people with whom one most closely identifies? Etc.	Where are the people from whom one solicits guidance? Etc.	Where are those people with whom one interacts the most? Etc.	Where is the outcome of actions desired? Etc.

Figure Four: Political transnationalism and the full model of transnational behavior.

society. In some European countries, this secularization has also manifested itself in the creation of Islamic organizations charged with representing Islam in the public sphere. These organizations are often associated with or even established by the government.” This adjustment is exhibited when Muslim groups justify their claims to specific rights (to dress, food or language) on the basis of ‘natural rights’ and ‘human rights’, rather than drawing on religious law (Soysal: 2002: 144). Similarly, many Muslim political groups have also embraced Western terminology in classifying themselves as a “minority group,” and in particular as an “ethnic group” which acquiesces to Western societies “ethnicization” of Muslims as a political constituency or “neo-ethnicity” (Roy, 2004). Such adaptation suggests that Bowen’s typology of “nationally differentiated” Islam should be further dichotomized into transnational Islam that is either *instrumentally* differentiated (for purposes of expedience) or *environmentally* differentiated (through a process of organic adaptation). From an instrumentalist perspective, Western “ethnic minority” status renders a rootless constituency institutional legitimacy, its can improve visibility and social status, and it fosters the promotion of claims-making representatives. While some heterogeneous Muslim communities are able to reconcile petty differences in the interest of institutionalization’s net benefits, this becomes more difficult at the national level. Thanks to vicious in-fighting, the British Government has not been able to identify a mandated broker for Muslim relations in a decade. Such brokers simply don’t exist at the transnational level.

Unlike other ethnic minorities, as a political project, Islam has no specific homeland for which to advocate or visit. With the exception of the re-establishment of the *khalifa* (which only a marginal minority of Muslims pursue), its causes are widely dispersed and may manifest in myriad different ways—whether as the contestation of autocracy in a Muslim-majority country or the appeal for equal rights and liberties in a Muslim-minority country. Few Western Muslims feel strongly enough about the *khalifa* or the politics of a third nation (not of their personal origin or nationality) to engage actively in a foreign public sphere. This not only re-directs efforts to the local; It also limits the extent of transnational politics to the sphere of rhetoric or sociality. As a result, transnational political projects have adapted their agendas, recruitment and appeals to different situated constituencies. In this way, transnational political parties, movements and brotherhoods are not that different from multi-national corporations. Both must modify their product to local preferences and tastes. Many differ in their political pursuits, and relate only to a certain degree from country to country.

The transnational political party *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir* has a specialized website the United Kingdom, but also for Turkey, the United States, Australia, Bangladesh, Denmark, and Malaysia, just to name a few. Each website appeals to followers in their local language and references political issues of local import. In London’s East End, *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir*’s approach is branded with a variety of British elements. Promotional videos emphasize women’s professional achievement in London’s financial district and Islamophobic rhetoric by the London mayor and other British political figures. At local *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir* meetings, organizers allude to Manchester United and Star Wars light sabers. Their messages regularly emphasize individual fulfillment over family relations. One would imagine this would not be true of counterparts’ meetings Indonesia. Each *Hizb-Ut-Tahrir* branch still preaches a universalist Islam—according to local tastes.

Hijab: Applying the Model

Our descriptive model of transnational behavior and its progressive expression is now complete. It is here important to emphasize that the model attempts to distill different expressions of transnational relations using “ideal types” of behavior. I certainly acknowledge that, in reality, single expressions of transnationalism may be construed or intended as concurrently religious, social, and political statements. A helpful test of this is the use of a *hijab*—or headscarf. Though regularly construed as a sign of oppression by some Western pundits and politicians, Western Muslim women who wear the *hijab* voluntarily cite a variety of concomitant reasons for their choice of apparel. Religiously, the *hijab* suggests humility, moral conservatism and has origins in historical Islamic texts (though not the Qur’an). Socially, the *hijab* functions as an identifying symbol and social marker for relations with the opposite sex. Politically, the *hijab* may reclaim a vilified identity or communicate solidarity with certain Muslim causes. However, Muslim causes range from the global movement to “free Palestine” to campaigns combating police profiling in local neighborhoods. Muslim social symbolism responds to local tastes and availability and the *hijab* may be worn for appearances in judgmental communities. Meanwhile, Muslim standards of religiosity adhere to different conventions in different places. Perhaps the most indicative statement about the variety of *hijabs* and the variety of impressions they evoke is from Qadim, an un-religious, former East End gang member:

You can tell how conservatively minded a girl is simply by looking at her clothes. The criterion is simple: Is she trying to draw attention to herself? Look for bright or dark, drab colors. Is she matching her hijab with her shoes? What is covered? How tight is her gown or clothes? How does she walk, does she strut or shuffle with her head down? See, look at this one... neon green hijab... look how she walks...this one is testing the limits of her religiosity...she wants to be more fashionable.¹

Outside of the East End, in Palestine itself, a neon green hijab may be interpreted as socially Western. In Saudi Arabia, it might be religiously forbidden. In laïque France, any hijab at all makes a political statement.² Indeed, one could hardly pinpoint the appearance of a “transnational” *hijab*. Piety is ultimately a dialogue between the believer and her understanding of God’s will. As the individual’s situated lens is therefore pertinent, it is logical to presume that the tint of that lens will have a profound effect on social and political action—mere manifestations of personal determinations.

Precisely because the *hijab* transcends the Situated Transnationalism model’s boundaries, it exhibits the analytical use of its ideal types. As underscored earlier in this article, the model separates each sphere of expression in order to:

¹ In this way, transnationalism is a much more public phenomenon for Muslim women than it is for men. Men have the capacity to make their transnationalism more private and subtle.

² In the United States, popular anxiety about its Muslim population has occurred less because of visible socio-cultural difference, as in Europe. Instead, American anxiety has been more political in nature. A country more accustomed to cultural differences and diasporic ties, the US appears to fear religious loyalty less than secular Europe. Indeed, the majority of its population is affiliated to one church or another without compromising the obligations of citizenship. For this reason, Americans tend to accept the reconcilability of piety and peaceful democratic activism. Instead, US concern appears to revolve around fears of an Islamic political agenda against America and its international partners.

- 1) aid observers in understanding the many dimensions of transnationalism;
- 2) develop observational or attitudinal criteria for objectively accounting for these dimensions and determining just how contextualized transnational behavior is;
- 3) exhibit the progressive difficulties associated with different spheres of transnational relations (ie: religiosity is influenced by local convention, sociality depends on interaction, political activism requires opportunity structures);
- 4) demonstrate, by juxtaposing the criteria and evidence presented here, how these different (but often simultaneous) expressions fall short of a genuinely “post-national” “abandonment” of the national and local public sphere.

In sum, this equips the social scientist with more rigorous criteria to properly evaluate social and political relations. It underscores the assumptions and oversights of earlier considerations of transnational behavior. And it evinces the enduring role of local factors, even in an age of relations defined by new capacities to connect across borders and seas.

Conclusion: A Local *Hijra*

The concept of the *hijra*—or emigration—has been a prominent subject of Western Muslim discourse. In their displacement in the democratic, Judeo-Christian West, many Muslims find parallels with the Prophet Muhammad’s exile to Medina, and indeed also with the Prophet’s time in pagan Mecca. For this reason, many in the younger generations of Western Muslims seek to make their own *hijra* to a place where they may be able to practice and live under a universalist Islam that unifies Muslims across ethnocultural barriers. Interestingly, the closest such place on Earth may very well be Birmingham, England. There, a large concentration of Muslims facilitates a free, local religiosity, sociality and polity under the optional civil guidance of *shari’ah* courts. Let this, but also the scores of other cited examples in this article, serve to show that Islam and Muslims are much more locally integrated in Western countries than is commonly perceived by local neighbors and citizens or portrayed by Muslims themselves.

A more unified, pure, singular, “transnational” Islam is perceived to be a stronger response to its vilification and scrutiny in contemporary Western political social discourse. Ironically, its embedment and adaptation to the situated environment is a more accurate depiction and a more persuasive counterargument anyway. This is true despite the ideas of not only those who claim Islam is de-culturating from its Western surroundings. It is also true despite the ideas of those who argue for Islam’s incompatibility with Western, democratic social and political life.

Works Cited:

Appadurai, Arjun, 'Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Post-National Geography' in Patricia Yeager (ed.), *The Geography of Identity* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

Bauman, Zygmunt (1996) "From Pilgrim to Tourist—Or a Short Story of Identity." in Hall, Stuart & du Gay, Paul (eds): *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Sage Publications Ltd, pp. 18-36.

Bowen, John (2004) "Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30 (5): 879-894.

Caglar, Ayse (2001) 'Constraining metaphors and the transnationalisation of spaces in Berlin,' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27(4): 601-13.

Cesari, Jocelyne (2009), *Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam* *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 8 (2009), 148–175.

Eickelman, Dale and Piscatori, James (1990) 'Social theory in the study of Muslim societies', in Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds), *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination*, London: Routledge, pp. 3–25.

Gest, Justin (2010) *Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Gest, Justin (2010) "Reluctant Pluralists: European Muslims and Essentialist Identity Structures," Working Paper.

Geertz, Clifford (1973/2000) *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books).

Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba (2008) "Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?" *International Migration Review* 42: 360-392.

Georges, E. (1990) *The Making of a Transnational Community: Migration, Development and Cultural Change in the Dominican Republic* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Grillo, Ralph D. (2004). "Islam and Transnationalism" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, 861-878.

Hall, Stuart (1996), "Ethnicity: Identity and Difference" in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming National* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hockenos, Pail, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*

Ismail, Salwa (2007) "Islamism, Re-Islamisation and the Fashioning of Muslim Selves: Refiguring the Public Sphere," *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*, 4 (1). Article 3.

Jones Correa, Michael (2002) "The Study of Transnationalism among the Children of Immigrants: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Headed" in Peggy Levitt and Mary Waters eds. *The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation* (New York: Russell Sage) pages 221-241.

Kepel, Gilles (2004), *The War for Muslims Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Mandaville, Peter (2009) "Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35:3, pages 491-506.

Mitchell, Kathryn (1993) "Multiculturalism, or the united colors of capitalism" *Antipode* 25: pages 263-294.

Pickles, Margaret (1995), 'Muslim Immigration Stress in Australia' in Syed Z. Abedin and Ziauddin Sardar (eds.), *Muslim Minorities in the West* (London: Grey Seal).

Portes, Alejandro (2001) 'The debates and significance of immigrant transnationalism,' *Global Networks* 1(3): 181-93.

Portes, Alejandro, L.E. Guarnizo and P. Landolt (1999) 'The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promises of an emergent research field,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 217-37

Ramadan, Tariq (1999) *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation).

Ramadan, Tariq (2001) *Islam, the West, and the Challenge of Modernity* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation).

Ramadan, Tariq (2004), *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Robbins, Bruce (1993) *Secular Vocations: Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture* (London: Verso).

Roy, Olivier, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

Salih, Ruba (2004) "The Backward and the New: National, Transnational and Post-National Islam in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30:5, 995-1011.

Smith, Michael P. and Luis Guarnizo, (1998) (eds.) *Transnationalism From Below* (New Brunswick: Transaction).

Smith, Michael P. (1992) "Postmodernism, Urban Ethnography, and the New Social Space of Ethnic Identity," *Theory and Society* 21: pages 493-531.

Somers, Margaret (1994) "The narrative construction of identity: A relational and network approach," *Theory and Society* 23(4): pages 605-649.

Soysal, Yasemin N. (2002): "Citizenship and Identity: living in diasporas in postwar Europe?" in U. Hedetoft and M. Hjort (eds.) *The Postnational Self* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Tibi, Bassam (2001) *Islam between Culture and Politics* (New York: Palgrave).

Valentine, Gill and Deborah Sporton (2009), "'How Other People See You, It's Like Nothing That's Inside': The Impact of Processes of Disidentification and Disavowal on Young People's Subjectivities," *Sociology*, 43:4 (August), pages 735-751.

Vertovec, Steven (2004) Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism WP-04-03, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No. 3, University of Oxford.

Wiktorowicz, Quentin (2005) *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield).

Werbner, Pnina (1997) "Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in the Study of Racism and Ethnicity" in T. Modood and P. Werbner (eds.) *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and Politics of Anti-Racism* (London: Zed).